

HS 1 ( <b>MASTER</b> ) The Design of International Institutions: Legalization and Compliance	Panke
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Tuesdays, 10.15 – 11.45 Breisacher Tor Raum 106

Cooperation beyond the nation-state takes place in a broad variety of international organizations, regimes and regional organizations, covering almost all policy areas. Over the decades, this has created a vast body of international norms. Based on a review of the theoretical literature on institutional design, the seminar studies the basic set-up of international organizations, regimes, and regional organizations. It sheds light on the following questions: Do institutional designs differ and if so, why? To which extent can institutional design influence state-behavior? What effects does institutional design have on negotiation dynamics as well as compliance? What are advantages and disadvantages of specific institutional designs? This seminar is open to students of the Master ‚Politikwissenschaft‘. In the course of the semester, the students will not only get familiar with the most prominent theories on institutional design, international negotiations and compliance, but also learn how to develop and execute qualitative research designs.

Introductory Literature:

- Abbott, Kenneth W., Robert O. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Anne Marie Slaughter, and Duncan Snidal. 2000. "The Concept of Legalization." *International Organization* 54: 401-19.
- Börzel, T. A., Hofmann, T., Panke, D. & Sprungk, C. (2010) Obstinate and Inefficient: Why Member States Do Not Comply with European Law. *Comparative Political Studies*, 43, 1363 –1390.
- Goldstein, Judith, Miles Kahler, Robert O. Keohane, and Anne-Marie Slaughter. 2000a. "Introduction: Legalization and World Politics." *International Organization* 54: 385-99.
- Goldstein, Judith L., Miles Kahler, Robert O. Keohane, and Anne-Marie Slaughter. 2000b. "Legalization and World Politics." *International Organization*, Special Issue 54.
- Goodin, Robert E., ed. 1995. *The Theory of Institutional Design*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Koremenos, Barbara, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal. 2001. "The Rational Design of International Institutions." *International Organization* 55: 761-99.
- Panke, Diana. 2006. "More Arguing Than Bargaining? The Institutional Designs of the European Convention and Intergovernmental Conferences Compared." *Journal of European Integration* 28: 357-79.

## Assessment

In order to obtain 12 ECTS credits, you need to

- Work on two group projects (including power point presentation and handout)
- Write an individual paper based on one of your group projects (20-25 pages)<sup>1</sup>

## Assigned Readings

All readings must be completed *before* the class session for which they are assigned! We work with the readings during class and it is important that you bring your copies and your notes along.

## Course Outline

Session number, date	Topic	Literature
21.4.15	Introduction Working with Theories I Basic concepts	(David and Sutton 2004) (chapter 12)
28.4.15	Theories I: International Cooperation under Anarchy	(Axelrod and Keohane 1986), (Waltz 1979) chapters “Political Structures” and “Anarchic Orders and Balance of Power”  Additional readings: (Garrett 1992), (Keohane and Nye 1977)
5.5.15	Theories II: Rational Institutional Design	Koremenos, B., Lipson, C. & Snidal, D. (2001)  Additional Readings: Panke (work in progress – incomplete contracting), (Goodin 1995), (Panke 2006)
12.5.15	Theories III: Legalisierung	(Abbott, et al. 2000, Goldstein, et al. 2000, Kahler 2000)  Zusatzlektüre: (Abbott 2000, Simmons 2000, Finnemore and Toope 2001)
19.5.15	Theories IV: Compliance: Enforcement & Management	(Downs, et al. 1996) (Chayes and Handler-Chayes 1993), (Börzel, et al. 2010)  Additional readings: (Martin 1992), (Downs 1998) Keohane, Moravcsik et al. 2000)
2.6.15	Working with Theories II Research Design,	(Kellstedt and Whitten 2009) (chapter 5) (David and Sutton 2004) (chapter 12) (Bryman 2008) (chapters 2,3 and 16)

<sup>1</sup> You cannot submit one paper as a group, each student needs to write his/her own paper.

	Empirical Analysis	Additional readings: (Kellstedt and Whitten 2009) (chapter 3) (Bryman 2008) (chapters 18, 21)
9.6.15	Group project (group 1): Mapping and explaining variation in institutional designs of IOs	
16.6.15	Group project (group 2): Mapping and explaining variation in institutional designs of IOs	
23.6.15	Group project (group 3): Mapping and explaining variation in institutional designs of IOs	
30.6.15	Group project (group 1): Mapping and explaining compliance effects of institutional designs of IOs	
7.7.15	Group project (group 2): Mapping and explaining compliance effects of institutional designs of IOs	
14.7.15	Group project (group 3): Mapping and explaining compliance effects of institutional designs of IOs	
21.7.15	Final discussion	

## Literature:

- Abbott, Frederick M. 2000. "Nafta and the Legalization of World Politics: A Case Study." *International Organization* 54: 519-47.
- Abbott, Kenneth W., Robert O. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Anne Marie Slaughter, and Duncan Snidal. 2000. "The Concept of Legalization." *International Organization* 54: 401-19.
- Axelrod, Robert A., and Robert O. Keohane. 1986. "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions." *World Politics* 38: 226-54.
- Börzel, Tanja A., Tobias Hofmann, Diana Panke, and Carina Sprungk. 2010. "Obstinate and Inefficient: Why Member States Do Not Comply with European Law." *Comparative Political Studies* 43: 1363 –90.
- Bryman, Alan. 2008. *Social Research Methods*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Chayes, Abram, and Antonia Handler-Chayes. 1993. "On Compliance." *International Organization* 47: 175-205.
- David, Matthew, and Carole D. Sutton. 2004. *Social Research. The Basics*. London: Sage.
- Downs, George W. 1998. "Enforcement and the Evolution of Cooperation." *Michigan Journal of International Law* 19: 319-44.
- Downs, George W., David M. Rocke, and et al. 1996. "Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About Cooperation?". *International Organization* 50: 379-406.
- Finnemore, Martha, and Stephen J. Toope. 2001. "Alternatives to "Legalization": Richer Views of Law and Politics." *International Organization* 55: 743-58.
- Garrett, Geoffrey. 1992. "International Cooperation and Institutional Choice: The European Community's Internal Market." *International Organization* 46: 533-60.
- Goldstein, Judith, Miles Kahler, Robert O. Keohane, and Anne-Marie Slaughter. 2000. "Introduction: Legalization and World Politics." *International Organization* 54: 385-99.
- Goodin, Robert E., ed. 1995. *The Theory of Institutional Design*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kahler, Miles. 2000. "Conclusion: The Causes and Consequences of Legalization." *International Organization* 54: 661-83.
- Kellstedt, Paul M., and Guy D. Whitten. 2009. *The Fundamentals of Political Science Reserach*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Keohane, Robert O., and Josphe S. Jr. Nye. 1977. *Power and Interdependence*. Boston, MASS: Little, Brown.
- Martin, Lisa L. 1992. *Coercive Cooperation - Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Panke, Diana. 2006. "More Arguing Than Bargaining? The Institutional Designs of the European Convention and Intergovernmental Conferences Compared." *Journal of European Integration* 28: 357-79.
- Simmons, Beth A. 2000. "The Legalization of International Monetary Affairs." *International Organization* 54: 573-602.
- Waltz, Kenneth. 1979. *Theory of International Politics*. New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing Company.